New Court of Appeal maritime collision decision – KIVELI c/w AFINA I – Appeal dismissed

Monford Management Ltd (the owners of the KIVELI) v Afina Navigation Limited (the owners of the AFINA I) [2026] EWCA Civ 251

Just shy of the five-year anniversary of the collision, the Court of Appeal has today handed down judgment dismissing KIVELI’s appeal against the Admiralty Court’s finding that the vessels were in a head-on situation, with the KIVELI being 80% at fault.

The case arises from a collision between the bulk carriers AFINA I and KIVELI, whilst both underway off the south coast of Greece on 13 March 2021.  Our previous article SHIP AHEAD, BUT IS IT HEAD-ON? sets out the factual background, and first-instance decision of Mr Justice Bryan, dated 16 May 2025, addressing the question which Rule of the 1972 Collision Regulations (“COLREGS”) applied: Rule 14 (the “Head-on Rule”) or 15 (the “Crossing Rule”).  In short, the Judge found the vessels were in a head-on situation, with a risk of collision, from C-22 (i.e. 22 minutes before the collision).  In doing so, he held that:

(i) Rule 14(b) is a deeming provision, and does not exhaustively define when Rule 14 applies (the “definitional issue”);

(ii) Rule 14(b) does not require that, by night, a vessel sees the masthead lights of the other in a line or nearly in a line as well as both sidelights (the “and/or” issue).

(iii) It is not necessary for Rule 14(b) to be satisfied by both vessels (the “A vessel” issue).

(Rule 14 is quoted below).

KIVELI sought leave to appeal on four grounds. Having been refused permission by the trial judge, KIVELI was subsequently granted leave by the Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Popplewell) on three of those grounds.

Following a hearing on 18 and 19 February 2026 (after an initial false-start a week earlier), the Court of Appeal (Lord Justices Coulson, Nugee and Foxton, with the latter delivering the lead judgment) has unanimously dismissed KIVELI’s appeal (with the draft judgment impressively produced within two weeks of the hearing).

MFB, together with Nigel Cooper KC and Robert Ward, represented the successful Owners and P&I insurers of AFINA I. The Court of Appeal judgment can be found here: Monford Management Ltd v Afina Navigation Limited - Find Case Law - The National Archives.

Rule 14 of the Collision Regulations

Head-on situation

(a) When two power-driven vessels are meeting on reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses so as to involve risk of collision each shall alter her course to starboard so that each shall pass on the port side of the other.

(b) Such a situation shall be deemed to exist when a vessel sees the other ahead or nearly ahead and by night she would see the mast head lights of the other in a line or nearly in a line and/or both sidelights and by day she observes the corresponding aspect of the other vessel.

(c) When a vessel is in any doubt as to whether such a situation exists she shall assume that it does exist and act accordingly.

Grounds of Appeal

KIVELI’s highly technical appeal involved the following points:

Ground 1: whether it was a “head-on” situation (broken down into four sub-issues):

1a) The “Definitional Issue” – whether Rule 14(b) exhaustively defines the limits of ‘reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses’ (within Rule 14(a)). 

1b) The “And/or Issue” – whether Rule 14(b) is engaged even if only one sidelight is visible.

1c) The “A vessel Issue” – whether Rule 14(b) must be satisfied by both vessels or (as the Admiralty Court held) by reference to what only one of the vessels sees.

1d) The “Rule 14(c) Issue” – whether this requires only the vessel in doubt to act, or both vessels (even if the other did not have such a doubt).

Ground 2 raised the Period of Application of Rule 14. If a “head-on” situation arises, does it continue at all relevant times thereafter, or does it cease to apply when the vessels cease to be “meeting on reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses so as to involve risk of collision” (i.e., on the facts of this case, when AFINA turned to starboard)?

Ground 3 was simply the converse of Ground 1 (if Rule 14 did not apply, the Judge should have applied Rules 15 to 17).

Proposed Ground 4 sought to challenge the Judge’s 80:20 apportionment even if there was and remained a “head-on” situation. Popplewell LJ refused permission to appeal under this ground, on the basis that “It is not arguable that the 80%/20% apportionment was outside the wide range which was reasonably open to [the Judge] on his findings.”

Interplay between the Ground 1 sub-issues

To succeed on Ground 1, KIVELI had to win on Ground 1(a), the Definitional Issue.  They also had to succeed either on:

• their “geometric argument” (a term given by the Court of Appeal), that Rule 14(b), when read with the rules about sidelights in Annex I paragraph 9, sets a precise geometric limit to the circumstances of its application (namely that one vessel is “nearly ahead” of another when it is within a 3˚ arc of a centreline of the other), which was not satisfied in this case; or

• their “and/or” argument (Ground 1(b)).

If both the geometric and “and/or” arguments fail, then Rule 14(b) was satisfied for both vessels on the Judge’s evaluative fact findings, which were not open to challenge.

Decision

The Court began with the geometric argument, and the “and/or” issue (Ground 1(b)); if neither of those succeeded, the appeal would fail. 

The geometric argument (paragraphs [86] – [109])

This argument was rejected. The Court considered that the ordinary meaning of the language of Rule 14(b), with references to “nearly ahead” and “nearly in a line”, did not lend itself to such a mathematical answer. The geometric argument involves “a very precise definition of, in the English language anyway, a very loose word” (per Coulson LJ in reference to ‘nearly’).  KIVELI’s reliance on Annex I paragraph 9 of the COLREGS was not accepted on the basis that (i) it is not referred to in Rule 14, or even Part B of the COLREGS, within which Rule 14 is to be found; and (ii) it gives a permissible range for sidelights to be visible (between 1 and 3 degrees), rather than an absolute value.  The Court also commented that, on this construction, there would be redundancy of the masthead lights requirement, which would be surprising seeing as this was introduced by the 1972 amendments to the COLREGS.

Ground 1(b): the “and/or” issue [110] – [130]

This argument was also rejected, on the basis that the ordinary meaning of “A and/or B” is that either A or B or both of them will suffice to establish that state of affairs. Applying this to the words in Rule 14(b), it is enough that the observing vessel can see either the masthead lights of the other in a line or nearly in a line, or both sidelights, or both the masthead lights of the other in a line or nearly in a line and both sidelights.

KIVELI’s submission that 14(b) should be read as requiring [i] the masthead lights of the other vessel to be in a line (or nearly); or [ii] the masthead lights to be in a line and both sidelights to be visible, was thought to “do violence to the text”, and would also mean the reference to masthead lights in [ii] would be largely superfluous (it being inevitable that they would be seen in a line if both sidelights are visible).

Having reviewed the Travaux Préparatoires to the 1972 COLREGS, textbooks and commentary (including articles discussing the Admiralty Court decision by Captains Hirst and Thornton), the Court found no reason to stray from the ordinary meaning of “and/or”.

Conclusion on Ground 1

Having rejected KIVELI’s submissions on these two issues, the appeal on Ground 1 failed, and the Court declined to address the remaining issues raised under Ground 1.

Ground 2 [133] – [139]

At first instance, the Judge held that once Rule 14 is engaged, it remains engaged until the risk of collision has passed.  KIVELI argued that if it is sufficient to bring the operation of Rule 14 to an end when one of its prerequisites no longer applies (the risk of collision), it must also be sufficient if the other prerequisite ceases to apply (the vessels meeting on reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses). Even if a head-on situation existed at C-22, KIVELI submitted it ceased to exist “by about C-7:45 or C-7”, by which time the vessels were said no longer to be on reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses.

The Court, however, agreed with the Judge’s interpretation; Rule 14(a) requires a course change “so that each shall pass on the port side of the other”. The Court also thought this conclusion offers “greater certainty as to which Rule applies rather than leading to a move between different Rules while the same risk of collision continues”, and was consistent with authority and commentary.

Ground 3 [140]

In light of the Court’s conclusions on Grounds 1 and 2, the Court held that Ground 3 did not arise.

Comment

Few would have predicted the course this case has taken.  The somewhat unique circumstances of this unfortunate incident have led to substantial academic discussion, legal submissions and judicial analysis of the 1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, the Travaux Préparatoires, collision caselaw, textbooks and industry commentary.

 With this decision, the Admiralty Court’s thorough analysis and practical application of Rule 14 has stood up to scrutiny and criticism.  The Court of Appeal's common-sense approach to interpretation of the head-on rule, in particular that once engaged it remains engaged until the risk of collision has passed, brings clarity to crew of ocean-going vessels as well as yachts of all sizes.

 Whilst the Court declined to decide some of the issues raised by KIVELI regarding Rule 14 (including the definitional argument, and the “a vessel” argument), leaving those for a case in which they are determinative, the Court's clear and decisive dismissal of KIVELI's appeal, on a technical and strained reading of Rule 14 (and Annex I), speaks volumes.

 It remains to be seen whether this will be the last word on this matter, or whether KIVELI will look to take this to the highest level.

MFB Solicitors 11 March 2026